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Abstract
We document that U.S. employment polarization in the 1980-2008 period is largely
generated by women. Female employment shares increase both at the bottom and at
the top of the skill distribution, generating the typical U-shape polarization graph,
while male employment shares decrease in a more similar fashion along the whole
skill distribution. We show that a canonical model of skill-biased technological change
augmented with a gender dimension, an endogenous market/home labor choice and a
multi-sector environment accounts well for gender and overall employment polarization.
The model also accounts for the absence of employment polarization during the 1960-
1980 period and broadly reproduces the different evolution of employment shares across
decades during the 1980-2008 period. The faster growth of skill-biased technological
change since the 1980s accounts for most of the employment polarization generated by
the model.
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Figure 1: Changes in employment shares in the U.S. between 1980 and 2008 by skill
percentile using a locally weighted smoothing regression. Data are from Census IPUMS 5
for 1980 and Census American Community Survey for 2008.
1 Introduction
Employment polarization in the U.S. has been extensively documented. Autor and Dorn
(2013) show the change from 1980 to 2008 in the share of U.S. employment by skill rank
and find an increase in employment shares both at the bottom and the top of the skill
distribution, combined with a decline in the middle. This pattern, reported by the black
continuous line in Figure 1, has become a well-known stylized fact. Less well known in the
literature instead, is the behavior of job polarization when distinguishing by gender, which we
also report in Figure 1. As the red line suggests, the overall phenomenon of job polarization
is mainly driven by women. These individuals are responsible for the rise at the bottom and
most of the rise at the top of the skill distribution, and for a small (relative to the aggregate
economy) decline in the middle. Changes in employment shares of men instead are between
-0.1 and 0 along the whole skill distribution except at the very top. The U-shape at the
aggregate level emerges from the aggregation of these two groups.1
In this paper we establish a number of facts on employment polarization that have not
been reported in previous literature. First, starting from the evidence in Figure 1, and
focusing on marital status, we document that the increase of female employment shares
at the top of the distribution in mainly due to married women, while single women are
responsible for the increase of employment shares at the bottom. We then show that changes
of employment shares of single individuals are in general flatter than those of married along
1Up to approximation due to the locally weighted smoothing regression, the black solid line is the vertical
sum of the gender lines. See section 3 for the formula used to compute polarization by gender.
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the skill distribution. A second set of observations concerns employment polarization by
broad sectors of economic activity. We document that changes in employment shares are
U-shaped and positive along the skill distribution for the services sector, while they are flat
for manufacturing. This observation suggests that the U-shape at the aggregate level is the
result of the aggregation of a different pattern of the two sectors. Finally, we document
that during the 1960-1980 period the change of employment shares of women along the skill
distribution is flat, and there is no job-polarization. This fact requires an understanding of
what triggered the different behavior of women after 1980.
The facts discussed above suggest that to gain additional insights on the process of
employment polarization, a theory that explains the observed demographic and sectoral
differences in employment changes is needed. In this paper, we build such a theory by focusing
on the following observations on the polarization era (commonly referred to as the 1980-2008
period). First, during this period the average growth of the skill premium of college graduates
relative to workers with less than a college degree is substantial, while the same average
growth is around zero between 1963 and 1980 (Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010)
and Acemoglu and Autor (2011)). The increase in the skill premium incentivizes education
during the 1980-2008 period, with an increases of a factor of 2.24 in the fraction of educated
women, compared to a factor of 1.40 in the fraction of educated men. Second, after 1980 the
share of home production (traditionally a female intensive sector) in total value added starts
declining steadily until the end of the 2000s, while it has been flat during the rest of the post-
war period (Moro, Moslehi, and Tanaka (forthcoming)). This decline coincides with a rise in
the market share of services substitutable to home production, which are typically low-skilled
services (Autor and Dorn (2013) and Bridgman (2016)) and an acceleration of modern market
services with respect to the pre-1980 period (Moro, Moslehi, and Tanaka (forthcoming)). To
see how these facts can be drivers of job polarization, consider the following theoretical
environment. Increasing skill-biased technological change improves market opportunities for
high-skilled individuals. This induces a high-skilled woman currently working at home to
enter the labor market and obtain a high-skilled job. This event has three potential effects on
employment shares. First, it increases employment shares at the top of the skill distribution.
Second, as the agent abandons home production, she is likely to purchase substitutes for
this in the market, typically represented by low-skilled services. By increasing the demand
for low-skilled services the agent fosters an increase in employment shares of low-skilled
individuals, who represent the bulk of employment in that market sector. Finally, as the
change in employment shares at the top and the bottom of the skill distribution is positive,
the change of employment shares in the middle must be negative. This example suggests
that by writing a model that allows to focus on the effect of skill-biased technological change
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on the home/market working decision of particular demographic groups, it is possible to
generate a U-shaped pattern of changes in employment shares along the skill distribution as
the one observed in Figure 1 for females and for the aggregate economy.
With the above intuition in mind, we extend the canonical model of skill-biased tech-
nological change (Acemoglu and Autor (2011)) by introducing the three building blocks of
our theory: i) a gender dimension; ii) an endogenous home/market labor supply; and iii) a
multi-sector environment. Such a model allows us to obtain predictions about changes in
employment shares of the two gender along the skill distribution as skill-biased technological
change occurs. We stress here that our three building blocks are crucial for the model to
reproduce the data pattern in Figure 1. In fact, it is well known that in general the canonical
model is not able to make predictions on job polarization.2 This is because, with only one
good produced in the economy, there are no interesting goods-demand effects that emerge
from changes in employment shares of skilled and unskilled individuals. In our setting in-
stead, in addition to technological change, the demand for a particular type of good concurs
to determine employment shares of the various types of workers employed in that sector.
We thus assume that there are three market sectors and a home sector. The three sectors
are modern services (services without a home produced counterpart), substitutable services
(services with a home produced counterpart) and manufacturing. We borrow this character-
ization of the structure of the economy from the literature of structural transformation for
two reasons. In the first place, following the intuition given above, we require an environ-
ment in which there is a market sector that produces an output that is substitutable to home
production, and a modern sector attracting most high-skilled individuals when skill-biased
technological change occurs. Secondly, we need to model different employment opportunities
in the market for men and women. Recent work suggests women have a comparative advan-
tage in services relative to manufacturing.3 We thus assume that a female agent with the
same characteristics of a male agent has a comparative advantage in both kinds of services
(modern and substitutable) relative to manufacturing.4 This is the only difference between
a man and a women in the model.
Agents in the economy are heterogeneous in that each agent is born with a triple of skills,
one for each market sector. Each of these skills determines the amount of efficiency units per
unit of time that the agent can supply in the corresponding market sector. Agents are also
2Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
3See Ngai and Petrongolo (forthcoming) and references therein.
4In addition, we also assume gender-biased technological change within each firm, following the specifica-
tion in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010). We do this because, although the mechanism working
through comparative advantage makes the gender wage gap close endogenously in the model, its effect is not
quantitatively strong enough, as discussed in Rendall (2010) and Ngai and Petrongolo (forthcoming).
4
allowed to obtain education by paying a cost. If an agent becomes educated she increases her
skill levels by a certain amount. Thus, for a unit of time supplied and the same skill level, the
productivity and the wage received by the educated individual are larger than those of the
uneducated. An agent, taking as given market wages, makes a contemporaneous decision on
the sector in which to work and whether to obtain education or not. Finally, the household
side of the model is closed by determining the marital status of each agent. We assume in
the model that a fraction of agents is single and the rest is paired to an agent of the other
gender to form a two-person household. The difference between the two types of agents is
that a married couple maximizes the unique utility function of the household and each agent
participates in home production.
Each market sector is given by a competitive representative firm that employs four types
of labor: educated males, educated females, uneducated males and uneducated females. It
is important to note here that all sectors can employ any type of worker, by gender, skill
and education level. However, the proportions of these groups will be different in the three
market sectors and calibrated to the data. The production function of each market sector is
affected by three types of exogenous technological change: labor productivity growth, skill-
biased technological change and gender-biased technological change. The only technological
change at home is labor productivity growth.
We calibrate the model to two equilibria representing the years 1980 and 2008 to match
a set of targets in the data, and evaluate its performance in replicating the main facts of
job-polarization. The two equilibria differ in the following exogenous dimensions: i) the
level of labor productivity of market sectors and the home sector; ii) the level of skill-biased
technology; iii) the level of gender-biased technology; and iv) marriage rates. Given these
differences, the model endogenously generates heterogeneous changes of employment shares
along the skill distribution. Our first contribution is to show that the model replicates fairly
well employment polarization by gender, by marital status and by sector.
We then use the model to study why polarization emerges in the 1980-2008 period.5
To answer this question we use the calibrated model to “forecast” changes in employment
shares from 1960 to 1980, by feeding trends of exogenous factors for that period. The data
show that the 1960-1980 period is characterized by an increase in employment shares of
women that is homogeneous along the skill distribution. Men instead display a monotone
behavior of changes in employment shares, with those in the bottom part of the distribution
displaying a negative change and those at the top a positive one. The resulting overall
5Without considering agricultural occupations Barany and Siegel (2015) suggest that job-polarization
starts in the 1950s, but it is more pronounced in the 1980-2008 period. Here we include agriculture and find
no polarization between 1960 and 1980.
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shape is a monotone function along the skill distribution. When we feed the model with
the exogenous trends for the 1960-1980 period, this accounts well for the flat behavior of
changes in women’s employment shares and reasonably well for the monotone behavior of
men’s employment shares. By running counterfactual experiments we find that the absence of
skill-biased technological change during that period significantly reduces of job-polarization.
Finally, we use the model to analyze employment polarization by decade during the 1980-
2008 period. Acemoglu and Autor (2011) show that the shape of the black line in Figure 1 is
the result of a different evolution of employment shares in the three decades 1980-1990, 1990-
2000, and 2000-2008.6 In particular, the polarization graph displays a clockwise tilting over
time, with the increase at the top of the skill distribution determined mainly in the 1980-2000
period, and the increase at the bottom being a feature of the 2000-2008 period. The model
reproduces fairly well such tilting, due to a time-varying effect that skill-biased technological
change has on the equilibrium of the model. In particular, the tilting is due to indirect
effects of skill-biased technological change that emerge over time: consumption spillovers
from skilled to unskilled individuals and q-complementarity in production between educated
and uneducated workers. We thus conclude that, in contrast with the standard result of
the canonical model, skill-biased technological change is a first order driver of employment
polarization in our setting.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature; section
3 establishes some facts on employment polarization in the U.S. that have not been considered
in previous literature; section 4 presents the model; section 5 discusses the calibration and
section 6 provides the benchmark results; section 7 presents the comparison between the
model and the data for the 1960-1980 period; section 8 analyzes the different behavior across
decades during the 1980-2008 period. Finally, section 9 concludes.
2 Related Work
This paper links three fields of research that so far have intersected only marginally: (1)
the effect of female labor force participation on macroeconomic outcomes, (2) structural
transformation, and (3) employment polarization. We connect these strands of the literature
by showing that the process of job polarization can be accounted for by women entering the
labor market in a multi-sector environment.
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010) use a dynamic one-sector heterogeneous
agents model with both skill-biased and gender-biased technological change to study the rise
of wage inequality in the U.S. They find that women participating more in the labor market
6See figure 10 in Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
6
over time play a key role in shaping this process. Here we study the effect of increasing
market hours of women on changes in employment shares along the skill distribution. To
do this we introduce the production function used by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2010) for each market sector in our model. As discussed above, the multi-sector assumption
is key to generate a demand for services that substitute for home production when women
work more in the labor market. This mechanism is described in Rendall (2015) and Ngai
and Petrongolo (forthcoming) in a multi-sector model with home production. They describe
how the process of marketization, occurring together with structural transformation, implies
that women progressively abandon home production to work in the market.7 Ngai and
Petrongolo (forthcoming) show that marketization and structural transformation explain
together a fraction of the evolution of the gender wage gaps of wages and hours in the U.S.
Our environment also builds on the insights in Buera and Kaboski (2012), who provide a
theory predicting that the demand for skills in the labor market increases due to the rise of
services that are skill-intensive, with a contemporaneous decline of home production. Buera,
Kaboski, and Zhao (2013) evaluate quantitatively such theory by also introducing skill-biased
technical change and gender, and find that both a higher demand for output which is skill-
intensive and increasing female labor supply are key factors to explain the growth of services.
In this paper we link skill-biased technological change to a gender and a sector dimension to
study employment polarization.
Recently, a number of contributions proved that the process of structural transformation
affects several dimensions of the macroeconomy, including aggregate productivity (Duarte
and Restuccia (2010) and Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2012)), growth (Moro (2015)), volatil-
ity (Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) and Moro (2012)), the amount of skill-biased technological
change (Buera, Kaboski, and Rogerson (2015)) and, especially relevant for our work, employ-
ment levels (Rogerson (2008)). However, few works relate this process to job-polarization.8
Autor and Dorn (2013) provide an explanation of job-polarization based on a mechanism
that has a flavor of structural transformation. They show how a two-sector environment with
high-skilled workers, low-skilled workers and capital can generate employment polarization
when there is technological change that reduces the price of capital over time. On another
note, Barany and Siegel (2015) are the first to suggest that structural transformation can
per-se be a main driver of employment polarization. By assuming a utility function in high-
7The relationship between home production and structural transformation has been extensively studied in
the literature. Se among others Rogerson (2008), Ngai and Pissarides (2008) and Rendall (2015). Consistent
with a lower working time at home, Bridgman (2016) and Moro, Moslehi, and Tanaka (forthcoming) show
that, when measuring home production at factor prices, the value added share of home in total value added
(i.e. GDP plus home production) starts declining after 1980.
8In recent work Duernecker and Herrendorf (2016) study the relationship between structural change and
the change in occupations composition in the U.S. but don’t focus on employment polarization.
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skilled services, low-skilled services and manufacturing with a low elasticity of substitution,
productivity trends of these three sectors imply that the share of manufacturing shrinks
with respect to the other two sectors. By their definition low-skilled services employ mostly
workers at the bottom of the skill distribution, high-skilled services those at the top, and
manufacturing the middle ones, therefore, the process of structural transformation generates
job polarization in this environment. While we use a specification of preferences similar to
Barany and Siegel (2015), and a Roy-type model, we depart in several dimensions from their
framework. First, we allow for different labor inputs by gender and education, and skill-
biased and gender-biased technological change in production. This implies that each of our
market sectors employ all types of workers. Second, we construct polarization graphs from
the model’s outcome, which allow us to make a close comparison with the data by skill level.
Finally, and most importantly, we show that employment polarization is largely a female
phenomenon.
Our modeling strategy is also related to the intuition discussed in Manning (2004) and
Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013). The idea is that consumption “spillovers”, i.e., an increase in
high-skill workers in the market, who have a high opportunity cost of working at home, in-
creases the demand for services in the market that have a home counterpart.9 While Manning
(2004) and Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013) take a local approach, by correlating an increase
in high-skilled workers with the demand for low-skilled workers in the same geographical
area, we show that this mechanism is quantitatively relevant in general equilibrium and it is
mainly due to female agents increasing participation in the labor market. Closely related to
this idea is also the work of Hazan and Zoabi (2015), who argue that the increase in income
inequality over the last thirty years created a group of women who can afford services that
are substitutable to home (in particular child care), and another one which supplies these
services. They find that, opposite to the past, highly educated women increased their fertility
rate during the 2000s, due to the reduction in the relative cost of child care in the market.
Interestingly, this period coincides with a large increase of employment shares at the bottom
of the distribution, which is captured by our model when we analyze polarization by decades.
Finally, note that the above considerations about gender and female labor force participa-
tion are only partially addressed in the polarization literature. Acemoglu and Autor (2011)
provide evidence on wage polarization by gender, but not on employment polarization. In
that chapter, they also provide a description of the canonical model with skill-biased techno-
logical change and show why it cannot address job-polarization issues. They suggest that a
9Cortes and Tessada (2011), instead, find that an increase in the supply of immigrants (typically producing
services that are substitutable to home production) increases market hours of women at the top of the skill
(i.e. wage) distribution.
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theory of job-polarization should consider a clear distinction between skills and tasks. There
are several advantages in doing this, in particular that of being able to study one of the main
drivers of job-polarization, which is the process of routinization.10 Here we take another
approach and show that considering gender and home production, a model of skill-biased
technological change can generate a pattern of employment polarization that is comparable
with the one in the data. To the best of our knowledge this is the first general equilibrium
model that can be used to produce polarization graphs that are comparable to the ones
commonly used in the literature to analyze the data, like those in Figure 1.11
3 Facts on Employment Polarization
Figure 1 in the introduction is obtained by computing, for each percentile i, the formula
Hi,2008
H2008
− Hi,1980
H1980
, (1)
where Ht is total hours worked in the economy in year t and Hi,t is total hours worked in
percentile i in year t. Consider now the following decomposition of this formula
Hi,2008
H2008
− Hi,1980
H1980
=
(
Hfi,2008
H2008
− H
f
i,1980
H1980
)
+
(
Hmi,2008
H2008
− H
m
i,1980
H1980
)
(2)
where Hfi,t is total hours worked by women in percentile i in year t, and H
m
i,t is the corre-
sponding measure for men. The equality follows from the fact that total hours in percentile
i in year t are given by female plus male hours, Hi,t = H
f
i,t +H
m
i,t. The first term on the right
hand side of (2) gives the the red line in Figure 1 while the second term provides the green
line in the same figure. In this section we use decompositions of equation (1) to establish
six facts on job-polarization in the U.S.12 All facts, except for number 5, refer to the period
1980-2008. Note that we define employment-polarization as a situation in which employment
shares increase at the bottom and at the top of the skill distribution, with a decline in the
middle. Thus, when the graph displays a U-shape, but changes in employment shares at the
bottom of the distribution are negative, there is no employment polarization.
Fact 1 (Gender): There is employment polarization for women and not for men (top-left
10See Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) and subsequent literature.
11In contemporaneous research, Cortes, Jaimovich, and Siu (2016) document that one third of the disap-
pearance of routine occupations are due demographic changes in the U.S. In a similar vein, we show here
that demographics is key for the whole process of employment polarization. In section 3 we also discuss some
evidence on gender and routine occupations.
12To do this, we use versions of (2) that consider different subgroups of the population.
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Figure 2: Job polarization by gender, marital status, and broad sector of economic activity.
panel of Figure 2).
Fact 2 (Marital Status): Married women contribute to the increase at the top of the
distribution more than single women and men. Single women contribute to the increase
at the bottom of the distribution more than married women and men. Single and married
men display a flat behavior along the skill distribution, with the former displaying positive
changes and the latter negative ones (top-right panel of Figure 2).
Fact 3 (Sectors): Changes in employment shares in services display a U-shaped be-
havior and are positive along the whole skill distribution. Changes in employment shares in
manufacturing display a relatively flat (with respect to services) behavior, and are negative
along the whole distribution (bottom-left panel of Figure 2).
Fact 4 (Gender and Sectors): In services, both women (to a larger extent) and
men (to a lesser extent) display a U-shaped behavior of changes in employment shares.
In manufacturing, changes in employment shares of men display a flat behavior along the
distribution, while women increase their employment shares in that sector at the top of the
distribution (bottom- right panel of Figure 2).
Fact 5 (Employment polarization before 1980): Employment polarization is absent
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Figure 3: Job polarization in the 1960-1980 period (left) and in the three decades during
the 1980-2008 period (right).
in the 1960-1980 period. Changes in employment shares of women are homogeneous along
the skill distribution, while those of men are increasing along the distribution for (almost)
any percentile (left panel of Figure 3).
Fact 6 (Employment polarization by decade): As documented in Acemoglu and
Autor (2011), the change in employment shares is monotonically increasing in the 1980-1990,
U-shaped in the 1990-2000 and monotonically decreasing in the 2000-2008 period (right panel
of Figure 3).
Taken together, this evidence suggests a key role of women in generating employment
polarization. This group increases employment shares in services, especially at the top and
at the bottom of the distribution. Men instead see on average a decline of their employment
shares, and the bulk of this decline occurs in the manufacturing sector. In addition, the
marital status appears to play an important role, especially for women, while for men it
only provides a level effect. Also, changes in employment shares of single women and single
men are similar along the whole distribution, while those of married women and married
men diverge substantially. Thus, a theory that aims at accounting for overall employment
polarization should potentially explain the different role of the various demographic groups in
shaping this phenomenon. In the following section we use a modified version of the canonical
model of skill-biased technological change and show that this is broadly consistent with Facts
1-6.
Before moving to the model, we stress here that the mainstream explanation for the
decline of employment shares in the middle of the skill distribution is routinization.13 This
13See, for instance, Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Acemoglu and Autor (2012), Autor and Dorn (2013).
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Figure 4: Job polarization in routine and non-routine occupations. Left: men routine and
non-routine. Right: overall routine and non-routine.
process, driven by the rise of information technology, makes workers performing jobs con-
taining a large share of routinary tasks redundant, as the latter are taken up by computers.
The evidence provided in the literature suggests that these type of occupations were in the
middle of the skill distribution in 1980. Thus, if routinization is the main driver of employ-
ment shares in the middle of the distribution, polarization graphs should be different for
routinary and non-routinary occupations. We report these graphs in the left panel of Figure
4.14 The panel confirms the well know fact in the literature that the decline of employment
shares in the middle of the distribution is due to routine occupations disappearing. However,
the green line also suggests that even the increase at the bottom and at the top is due largely
to routine occupations. Put it differently, the U-shape is entirely generated by routine oc-
cupations, with the non-routine occupations displaying changes in employment shares that
are similar along the distribution, with a larger increase only after the 90th percentile.
The gender dimension allows us to address the routinization hypothesis from another
angle. In fact, the difference between routinary and non-routinary occupations should be
especially evident for men, the demographic group that loses the bulk of employment shares
over time, as shown in the left panel of 1. Instead, the left panel of Figure 4 shows that
polarization graphs for these two groups trace each other along the whole skill distribution
and are remarkably different from the black aggregate line. Thus, the gender dimension
suggests that in addition to the routine/non-routine dichotomy, other channels might be
determining the U-shape at the aggregate level.
Finally, in Table 1, we perform an accounting exercise to measure the contribution to job-
polarization of different pairs of categories that sum to the total population: female/male,
14We use the definition of routine and non-routine occupations in Autor and Dorn (2013).
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Table 1: Job-Polarization Accounting
% Explained by D1 D4 D5 D9 D10
Women (Men 1980) 66 68 18 131 90
Men (Women 1980) 23 17 62 -8 30
Industry (Services 1980) -166 144 144 -19 21
Services (Industry 1980) 169 14 1 92 79
Routine (Non-Routine 1980) 85 115 103 74 64
Non-Routine (Routine 1980) 8 -12 -1 25 36
industry/services and routine/non routine. In each exercise we fix the hours of one of the
two categories to their 1980 level. Thus, for instance, the first row of the table reports
how much of the variation in employment shares by decile can be accounted for by changes
in women hours, as men hours are held fixed to their 1980 level.15 We report the deciles
that characterize job polarization, namely the first, the middle and the last deciles. By
fixing men hours to 1980, the change in women hours can account for a large share of the
change in deciles 1, 4, 9 and 10. Instead, by fixing women hours to 1980, men can account
for a significant portion of job-polarization for decile 5. When repeating the exercise for
industry/services, it emerges how services account for deciles at the bottom and the top of
the distribution and industry for those in the middle. Instead, when distinguishing routine
and non-routine, the third and fourth lines show how routine occupations account for a
large portion of employment polarization in each decile. Non-routine occupation instead,
account for a small portion at all percentiles. While routinization represents an important
driver of the disappearance of middle skill occupations, our aim in the next sections is to
show that when considering the gender dimension, skill-biased technological change is a key
determinant of Facts 1-6. We thus leave the introduction of routinization in this context for
future research.
4 Model
The model economy consists of three market sectors, modern services, ms, substitutable
(to home) services, ss, manufacturing goods g, and a home sector, h. The environment is
static such that given the fundamentals at time t, the equilibrium of the model is uniquely
determined in that period.
15By construction then, the sum of each pair of rows does not sum to 100.
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4.1 Agents
There are two masses of agents in the economy, one of female agents and one of male agents.
The female and the male population can be of different size. Both types of agents are
heterogeneous such that each one has a skill level to work in services that are substitutable
to home production (ss), a skill level to work in manufacturing (g for goods) and a skill
level to work in modern services (ms).16 Hence, each agent is endowed with a triple of skills
ai = [aiss, a
i
g, a
i
ms], where i = f,m, and f stands for female and m for male. Thus, there
exist two density functions of agents with characteristics [aiss, a
i
g, a
i
ms]. Each characteristic is
between amin and amax and an agent of type i is perfectly identified by a point in the support
of the trivariate distribution f(ai) = f
(
aiss, a
i
g, a
i
ms
)
.
Each agent is also endowed with one unit of time. She splits this between work at home
(l) and work in the market (1− l). Thus, a unit of time of agent of type i, depending on the
sector it is employed,corresponds to: i) aims efficiency units of labor to production in sector
ms; ii) aig efficiency units of labor to production in sector g; iii) a
i
ss efficiency unit of labor to
production in sector ss; and iv) 1 efficiency unit of labor to production in the home sector
h.
4.2 Education and job decision
The education level and the sector where the agent works are jointly chosen. There are
two different education levels e = 0, 1. When the agent chooses e = 1, she pays the fixed
cost χi and increases her ability from aij to
(
aij
)1+ζ
.17 As in Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2010), we assume that agents draw the cost of education χi from a gender specific
distribution such that log(χi) ∼ N
(
µiχ,
(
σiχ
)2)
, i = f,m. By acquiring education, the
agent upgrades her wage per unit of efficiency, wi,ej , from that of uneducated, w
i,0
j , to that
of educated individuals, wi,1j , where j = ss, g,ms is the sector where the agent decides to
work. Since there are two education levels and three market sectors, the agent, depending
on her skill vector, and taking as given the equilibrium (gender-specific) market wages per
unit of efficiency in the three sectors and for each level of education, chooses the pair (e, j) ∈
{0, 1} × {ss, g,ms} in order to maximize her efficiency wage net of education costs.
The optimal choice by an agent of gender i, with ability ai = [aiss, a
i
g, a
i
ms] and fac-
ing a vector of equilibrium market wages wi,e = [wi,ess , w
i,e
g , w
i,e
ms] is then a pair (e
∗, j∗) =
16The methodology to define substitutable services in the data is described in Section 5.
17This complementarity assumption is driven by the complementarity between skill levels and education
attainment documented in recent work. See Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) and Findeisen and Sachs
(2015).
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[e(ai, wi,e, i), j(ai, wi,e, i)] ∈ {0, 1} × {ss, g,ms} such that
(e∗, j∗) = argmax(e,j)
[
wi,ej
(
aij
)(1+eζ) − eχi] (3)
Notice that conditional on e∗ = 0, (0, j∗) = argmax(0,j)
[
wi,0j
(
aij
)]
, so that the agent
chooses to work in the sector j which, given her ability and the market wages per unit of
efficiency, ensures the highest efficiency wage wi,0j a
i
j. By contrast, conditional on e
∗ = 1,
(1, j∗) = argmax(1,j)
[
wi,1j
(
aij
)(1+ζ) − χi], the agent chooses to work in the sector which
ensures the highest actual wage net of the education cost.
Note also that it can be that argmax(0,j)
[
wi,0j a
i
j
] 6= argmax(1,j) [wi,1j (aij)(1+ζ) − χi], so
that the sector which ensures the maximum wage with education investment might be differ-
ent from the sector which ensures the maximum wage without education. Put it differently,
we allow for an interaction between human capital investment and structural change: on
the one hand, investing in human capital might be convenient only if the agent switches
to another sector; on the other hand, switching to another sector might be profitable only
conditional on human capital investment.
4.3 Consumption and time allocation decisions
Before choosing the consumption and time allocations, each agent chooses the education level
e and in which sector j to work to maximize her wage net of education costs, wi,ej
(
aij
)(1+eζ)−
eχi. This implies that this wage is taken as given in the maximization problem involving
consumption and labor. We define the maximum efficiency wage net of education for an
agent of type i as follows
W
(
aij∗ , w
i,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)
= wi,e
∗
j∗
(
aij∗
)(1+e∗ζ) − e∗χi (4)
being e∗ and j∗ the level of education and the sector of work optimally chosen by an agent
of type i.
Regarding the consumption and time allocation there are three kinds of decision units
(i.e. households) in the model, z = c, f,m : 1) a household c, which is formed by a couple of
a female and a male individual; 2) a single female f ; 3) a single male m. The utility function
of a decision unit z = c,f,m is
U z =
(
(ωms)
1/σ
(
czms
κz
)σ−1
σ
+ (ωg)
1/σ
(
czg
κz
)σ−1
σ
+ (ωs)
1/σ
(
c˜zts
κz
)σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
, (5)
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c˜zts =
(
ψ (czss)
γ−1
γ + (1− ψ) (czh)
γ−1
γ
) γ
γ−1
+ c¯ (6)
where czms is consumption of modern services, c
z
g is consumption of manufacturing, c˜
z
ts
represents traditional services (ts), which is an aggregator of czss, consumption of substi-
tutable services and czh, which is consumption of home services. The parameter κ
z represents
economies of scale for the couple.18 Following the findings in Moro, Moslehi, and Tanaka
(forthcoming) we assume that the income elasticity of traditional services is different from
that of modern services, and introduce the negative non-homothetic term c¯.
The first three types of consumption are purchased in the market, while home services
are produced within the household. Each agent is endowed with 1 unit of time and each
household devotes a fraction of this time to home production and the remaining time to
market work. In the case of the couples, z = c, both male and female labor is used to
produce home services. This is not so when the decision unit is a single women (z = f , no
male labor is available) or when it is a single man (z = m, no female labor is available). For
each type of household, home services are produced according to the following technology
Y zh = AhL
z, (7)
where
Lc = Ah
[
ϕch
(
lf
) η−1
η + (1− ϕch) (lm)
η−1
η
] η
η−1
, (8)
Lf = Ah
(
ϕfh
) η
η−1
lf , (9)
Lm = Ah (ϕ
m
h )
η
η−1 lm, (10)
The budget constraint changes across household types being
pmsc
z
ms + pgc
z
g + pssc
z
ss = E
z, (11)
where
Ec = W
(
aij∗ , w
i,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)
(1− lf ) +W
(
aij∗ , w
i,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)
(1− lm), (12)
Ef = W
(
aij∗ , w
i,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)
(1− lf ), (13)
Em = W
(
aij∗ , w
i,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)
(1− lm). (14)
18So in the calibrated model we will have κf = κm = 1 and κc = 1.5 from the scale equivalence computed
by the OECD.
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We highlight that when z = c (when the decision unit is a couple) every female agent
always works in the market in the sector with the highest W
(
afj∗ , w
f,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)
irrespective of
her husband’s choice as the households maximizes total utility.19
Each decision unit z = c, f,m chooses the amount of consumption of each good cj and
the time devoted to home production by men and women lm and lf in order to maximize
utility (5), subject to the service aggregator (6), the budget constraint (11) and the home
production technology constraint (7).
From first order conditions we obtain the relative time of work at home of spouses, which,
in an interior solution, is given by
lf
lm
=
 ϕh
1− ϕh
W
(
amj∗ , w
m,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)
W
(
afj∗ , w
f,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)
η . (15)
Thus, the time of work at home of a female agent increases with the wage and the ability
of the male in the market (which can be boosted by education) and declines with the wage
and the ability of herself in the market.
From utility maximization we can derive an implicit price for home services, which is the
key dimension in which singles and married are different. For married, this is given by
pch =
1
Ah
[
ϕηh
[
W
(
afj∗ , w
f,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)]1−η
+ (1− ϕh)η
[
W
(
amj∗ , w
m,e∗
j∗ , e
∗
)]1−η] 11−η
. (16)
The price of home services is household specific, which is due to the fact that, the higher
the efficiency wage of a member of the household, the higher the opportunity cost of working
at home rather than in the market. Thus, the model predicts that households with higher
abilities tend to work more in the market and less at home, compared with households with
lower abilities.
The home price for a single individual is
pih =
W
(
aij∗ , w
i
j∗ , e
∗)
Ah
(
ϕih
)− η
η−1 . (17)
This implicit price is increasing in ability so that a single agent with higher ability works
more in the market and less at home, compared with a single agent with lower abilities. By
comparing (16) and (17) it is also possible to see that changes in market conditions (i.e.
wages) have a different effect on the price of home production of married and singles, which
translates, ceteris paribus, into a different decisions on how much to work at home and in
19A similar discussion can be made for a married men.
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the market for the two types of households.
4.4 Firms and sectors
There is a representative firm in each market sector j=ms, g, ss. Each representative firm
has the following production function
Yj = AjNj, (18)
where
Nj =
[
φj
(
ϕjN
f,1
j + (1− ϕj)Nm,1j
) ηs−1
ηs
+ (1− φj)
(
ϕjN
f,0
j + (1− ϕj)Nm,0j
) ηs−1
ηs
] ηs
ηs−1
,
(19)
and N i,ej is the aggregator of labor efficiency units of agents of gender i = m, f and
education level e = 0, 1 in sector j. Our production function follows Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante (2010) in displaying 1) perfect substitutability across gender; 2) gender-biased
technology (through the parameter ϕj) 3) imperfect substitutability across education levels
(ηs > 1 being the elasticity of substitution between educated and non-educated workers);
and 4) skilled-biased technology (through the parameter φj).
The representative firm operating in sector j maximizes profits
pij = pjYj − wf,1j N f,1j − wm,1j Nm,1−j wf,0j N f,0j − wm,0j Nm,0j (20)
subject to (18) and (19).
First order conditions imply
φj
(
ϕjN
f,1
j + (1− ϕj)Nm,1j
)− 1
ηs
(1− φj)
(
ϕjN
f,0
j + (1− ϕj)Nm,0j
)− 1
ηs
=
wm,1j
wm,0j
(21)
ϕj
1− ϕj =
wf,ej
wm,ej
(22)
Equation (21) shows that, other conditions equal, skill-biased technological change due to a
time varying φj, raises the skill premium. Equation (22) shows that gender-bias technological
change, in the form of growing ϕj, directly affects the wage ratio between males and females.
Note, however, that the initial value of ϕj can be different across sectors, so that the aggregate
gender wage gap is determined endogenously and changes over time, even without gender-
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biased technological change.
4.5 Definition of equilibrium
The equilibrium is defined as a set of prices {pss, pg, pms}, a set of wages per unit of efficiency{
wf,1ss , w
f,1
g , w
f,1
ms, w
m,1
ss , w
m,1
g , w
m,1
ms , w
f,0
ss , w
f,0
g , w
f,0
ms, w
m,0
ss , w
m,0
g , w
m,0
ms
}
, a set of choices for each
agent (e∗, j∗) and a set of allocations for each household
{
czss, c
z
g, c
z
ms, l
fz, lmz
}
such that:
1. Given wages and prices, the choice (e∗, j∗) maximizes wages net of education costs for
agent i by solving (3);
2. Given wages, prices, and (e∗, j∗) of each household member, the allocation
{
czss, c
z
g, c
z
ms, l
fz, lmz
}
maximizes utility (5) of the household subject to the budget constraint (11);
3. Given wages and prices, each representative firm in sectors ss, g, and ms maximizes
profits (20);
4. Labor markets in sectors ss, g, and ms clear;
5. Goods markets in sectors ss, g, and ms clear.
5 Calibration
We calibrate the model to two equilibria to replicate a series of targets of the U.S. economy
in the years 1980 and 2008. We allow for the following exogenous differences between the
two equilibria: i) the level of labor productivity of market sectors and the home sector; ii)
the level of skill-biased technology; iii) level of gender-biased technology; and iv) marriage
rates.
A number of parameters, {σ, γ, η, ηs}, are set from previous study. Following Ngai and
Pissarides (2008) we set σ = 0.3 and γ = 2.3. η is estimated in Knowles (2013) to 3,
while the elasticity of substitution between educated and uneducated workers is taken from
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010) and set to ηs = 1.43. Ability is assumed to be
uniformly distributed, with aj ∈ [aj, aj] and with men and women drawing from the same
ability distribution by sector when born. The lower bound of ability in the substitutable
service sector is ass = 0.5. Spouses’ abilities are correlated with correlation coefficient ρj.
These correlations are computed using data on U.S. wages. To compute the correlation
between husband and wife wages, we first compute female wages by sector correcting for
selection bias using the Heckman correction, and second correlate wages of husbands and
wives that work in the same sector. The correlation, averaging from 1978 to 2010, is 0.32 for
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manufacturing, 0.25 for low-skilled services and 0.26 for high skilled services. These values
provide our correlation of skills measure. Initial productivities by sector, including the home
sector, are normalized to one, Aj,1980 = 1 and Ah,1980 = 1. Home labor productivity growth
γh is measured to be 0.1 percent in Bridgman (2016) and -0.4 percent in Moro, Moslehi,
and Tanaka (forthcoming) for the 1978-2010 period. We choose the value of 0.001 in our
calibration. In addition, OECD economies of scales assume the first adult in consumption
accounts for 1.0, but the second adult accounts for a factor of 0.5 in a multi-person household.
Therefore, it is assumed that κ = 1.5 for married households and κ = 1 for single households.
The remaining 28 parameters: (1) ability and return to education {ass, ams, ams, ag, ag, ζ},
(2) productivity (market and home) {{ϕj,1980, φj,1980}j=ms,g,ss, ϕh, ϕfh, ϕmh }, (3) preferences
and distribution of education cost {ωms, ωg, ψ, c¯, µfχ, µmχ , σfχ, σmχ }, and (4) time trends for
sector productivity, gender-biased and skill-biased technological change {{γj}j=ms,g,ss, γϕ, γφ}
are calibrated to match a number of moments.20 Table 2 lists the parameter values used in the
simulation and the standard errors obtained using a nonparametric bootstrap, by sampling
individuals with replacement. While the calibration procedure matches all 28 parameters
to 28 moments concurrently, by minimizing the distance between data targets and model
moments, some targets are more informative for certain parameters than others. Below we
outline the general strategy.
Ability parameters, {ass, ams, ams, ag, ag} (5 targets): male modern services (industry) to
substitutable services wage premiums and the standard deviation of log male wages of full-
time full-year workers from the CPS in 1980 in the three market sectors. Relative weights
in consumption, {ωms, ωg} (2 targets): share of hours in modern services and industry in
1980. Home production {ϕfh, ϕmh , ϕch, ψ} (4 targets): married male market hours, single male
market hours, married female market hours and single female market hours. Gender gaps
in the market in 1980, {ϕj,1980}j=ms,g,ss (3 targets): aggregate gender wage gap, female
to male industry hours gap, female substitutable services to modern services hours gap.
Education determinants, {ζ, µfχ, µmχ , σfχ, σmχ , {φj,1980}j=ms,g,ss} (8 targets): the male and the
female college wage premium in 1980, the share of educated men and women in 1980, the
relative hours of uneducated (LTC=less than college) to educated in manufacturing and
substitutable services and the fraction of educated women and educated men in 2008. Non-
homotheticity in consumption {c¯} and sectoral productivity growth rates {γj}j=hs,ls,g (4
targets): the changes over time of hours in industry, hours in modern services, industry to
substitutable services wage, and modern services to substitutable services wage. Skill-biased
technological change, {γφ} (1 target): the growth in the male college wage premium between
1980 and 2008. Gender-biased technological change, {γϕ} (1 target): the growth in the
20Note that ωss = 1− ωms − ωg.
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Table 2: Model Parameters
Estimated Type Value S.E.
{ass, ass} Substitutable services ability {0.50, 3.37} {−, 0.0011}
{ams, ams} Modern services ability {1.05, 4.87} {0.0014, 0.0008}
{ag, ag} Manufacturing ability {0.77, 4.40} {0.0055, 0.0009}
ωms Consumption market weight modern services 0.43 0.0002
ωg Consumption market weight manufacturing 0.33 0.0002
ψ Substitutable services weight 0.25 0.0003
ϕch Home female-labor weight 0.54 0.0006
ϕfh Single female home labor weight 0.41 0.0016
ϕmh Single male home labor weight 0.50 0.0022
ϕms,1980 Female-labor weight in modern services 0.34 0.0002
ϕg,1980 Female-labor weight in manufacturing 0.31 0.0002
ϕss,1980 Female labor weight in substitutable services 0.37 0.0002
ζ Schooling factor 0.21 0.0010
µfχ Mean of the cost of education female 0.64 0.0063
µmχ Mean of the cost of education male 1.26 0.0199
σfχ Variance of the cost of schooling female 0.94 0.0048
σmχ Variance of the cost of schooling male 1.05 0.0229
φms,1980 Educated workers labor weight in modern services 0.34 0.0003
φg,1980 Educated workers labor weight in manufacturing 0.32 0.0007
φss,1980 Educated workers labor weight in substitutable services 0.38 0.0008
c¯ Non-homothetic consumption in traditional services -0.09 0.0002
γhs Annual growth in Ahs 0.004 0.0002
γls Annual growth in Als 0.017 0.0002
γg Annual growth in Ag 0.034 0.0002
γφ Skill-biased tech. change (annual growth rate in φj) 0.013 0.0001
γϕ Gender-biased tech. change (annual growth rate in ϕj) 0.005 0.0001
Predet. Type Value
σ Substitutability between broad cons. categories 0.3
γ Substitutability between home and market services 2.3
η Gender substitutability at home (married only) 3
ηs Substitutability educated/uneducated in production 1.43
γh Annual growth in Ah 0.001
Note: The first set of parameters is estimated (except ass) while the second set is predetermined. Column
S.E. displays, for estimated parameters, the standard errors obtained obtained through parametric
bootstrap with 500 repetitions.
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aggregate gender wage gap between 1980 and 2008. All targets are computed using the 1980
Census and the 2008 American Community Survey unless noted.
To define services sectors that are substitutable to home we use the procedure in Moro,
Moslehi, and Tanaka (forthcoming). First, from time use surveys we select home activities
that are considered home production. We follow Bridgman, Dugan, Lal, Osborne, and Vil-
lones (2012) and Landefeld and McCulla (2000) and define seven broad categories: “cooking”,
“house work”, “odd jobs”, “gardening”, “shopping”, “child care”, and “travel”, where the last
one is intended as travel related to the other six categories. We then use the 1990 CENSUS
classification (3 digits) to select industries producing an output that is “close” in nature to
the output produced by the seven home activities. Selected industries are: Bus service and
urban transit; Taxicab service; Retail bakeries; Eating and drinking places; Liquor stores;
Private households; Laundry, cleaning, and garment services; Beauty shops; Barber shops;
Dressmaking shops; Miscellaneous personal services; Nursing and personal care facilities;
Child day care services; Family child care homes; Residential care facilities, without nursing.
Changes in the demographic structures in U.S. data are summarized in table 4. To match
such trends in the model, we create probability weights for each type of agent related to the
different marriage rates (including the assortative mating patterns). More specifically, we
create a matrix of the population of size 50,000x2 of males and females, respectively. Assume
column one is made up of only men and column two of only women. The demographic
structure is then constructed in three steps. First, male agents are created with random
draws of abilities from the three uniform distributions by sector. Female agents (by row)
draw from the same uniform distributions, but adjusted by the correlation coefficients ρ′js
between men and women by sector. That is, each row has the correlation of abilities found
in U.S. data by sector. Second, each agent chooses her/his education outcome independently
of the other gender. Given the cost distribution of education, there is only imperfect sorting
into college. Lastly, each row (which represents a potential household) is given a probability
of being either married or single such that the shares in table 4 are matched. Thus, while
the population of agents is the same in each steady state, both aggregate marriage trends
and assortative mating patterns are identical in the model and data.
It is worth emphasizing the following differences between the two equilibria: 1) the share
of educated individuals grows for both men and women but relatively faster for women; 2)
among the latter, the share of educated individuals increases faster for married rather than
for single women; 3) the aggregate marriage rate decreases and 4) assortative matching by
education level increases.
Finally, note that this is the first paper that compares polarization graphs in the data with
the outcome of a general equilibrium model. Thus, one challenge is how to draw polarization
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Table 3: Model Targets
Type Data Model
1980 - ability
({aj , aj}j=ms,g,ss)
Male industry to substitutable services wage 1.33 1.41
Male modern services to substitutable services services wage 1.42 1.48
Standard deviation of industry log male wages 0.27 0.31
Standard deviation of substitutable services log male wages 0.28 0.28
Standard deviation of modern services log male wages 0.29 0.34
1980 - education cost
({µiχ}i=m,f)
Fraction of educated men in 1980 0.16 0.16
Fraction of educated women in 1980 0.13 0.13
1980 - consumption ({ωj}j=ms,g,ss)
Share of hours in industry 0.35 0.35
Share of hours in modern services 0.59 0.57
1980 - home production
(
ψ,ϕch, ϕ
f
h, ϕ
m
h
)
Married male market hours 0.78 0.95
Single male market hours 0.61 0.51
Married female market hours 0.34 0.36
Single female market hours 0.49 0.48
1980 - Gender weights in the market ({ϕj}j=ms,g,ss)
Aggregate Gender Wage Gap 0.59 0.46
Female to male industry hours gap 0.32 0.32
Female subst. serv. to modern serv. hours gap 0.17 0.14
1980 - education ability returns (ζ, {φj,1980}j=ms,g,ss)
Female college wage premium 1.57 1.62
Male college wage premium 1.54 1.65
Share of LTC Hours in manufacturing 0.88 0.84
Share LTC Hours in substitutable services 0.92 0.79
Variance of education cost
(
σmχ , σ
f
χ
)
Fraction of educated men in 2008 0.28 0.27
Fraction of educated women in 2008 0.27 0.27
1980-2008 - non-homotheticity and productivity (c¯, {γj}j=ms,g,ss)
Hours in industry (change over time) 0.67 0.72
Hours in modern services (change over time) 1.24 1.28
Industry to substitutable services wage (change over time) 0.99 0.94
Modern serv. to substitutable serv. wage (change over time) 1.19 1.10
1980-2008 - skill-biased and gender-biased technological change ({γj}j=φ,ϕ)
Gender wage gap (change over time) 1.25 1.28
Relative college wages (change over time) 1.28 1.33
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Table 4: Demographic Changes
1980 2008
Singles
Male 0.23 0.31
Female 0.26 0.30
Share Educated
Single Men 0.16 0.19
Single Women 0.13 0.23
Married Men 0.20 0.34
Married Women 0.13 0.32
Couple Types
Educated Couples 0.09 0.22
Educated Husband Only 0.11 0.12
Educated Wife Only 0.04 0.10
Uneducated Couples 0.76 0.56
graphs in the model that are comparable with those in the data. We proceed as follows. First,
within each market sector in the model we create equally sized bins of workers with similar
ability along the sector skill distribution using the 1980 equilibrium. We do this because,
for instance, the ability level of a worker in manufacturing cannot directly compared with
the ability level of a worker in high-skilled services. Next, we compute the average wage in
each bin. Then, we rank all bins from the three market sectors into a unique classification
by using the average wage in each bin in the 1980 equilibrium. This ranking is then kept for
the 2008 equilibrium to construct polarization graphs. We apply the same method to the
data. That is, within each market sector in 1980 we create bins of occupations with similar
wage, and compute the average wage in each bin. Then we rank bins from the three sectors
into a unique classification using the average wage in each bin. Then, by keeping the same
ranking in 2008 we construct employment polarization graphs.
Note that in the data, certain occupations are in all three sectors (e.g., secretaries),
but others are likely just in one of the three (miners). So in our method we have four
occupations and wage rates in 1980. Instead, the original method in Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) computes an average wage for secretaries in the U.S. economy in 1980 and one for
miners. So instead of four occupations and wage rates in 1980, they have two. Besides that
the two methods are identical, that is, we rank occupations by their wages in 1980 from 1 to
100. As Appendix A shows, the differences between the two methods in the data are very
minor, and mostly at the right tail of the overall distribution. The reason for this difference
is that in our methodology some occupation groups are more homogeneous.
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Figure 5: Job polarization in the data (left) and in the model (right). First row: gender;
second row: marital status and gender.
6 Results
Figure 5 presents the comparison between polarization in the data and the respective polar-
ization graphs generated by the model.21 The top-right panel of Figure 5 shows that model
performs well in replicating the main features of the data, in particular the standard pattern
of overall polarization. Employment shares increase both at the bottom and the top of the
skill distribution, while they decline in the middle of the distribution. The model also gener-
ates similar patterns with respect to the data when decomposed by gender. Women generate
an increase in employment shares at the bottom and the top of the skill distribution, with a
decrease in the middle. The behavior of men is also broadly consistent with the data, with
a decrease of employment shares along most of the skill distribution, except for an increase
at the top. However, such increase is too pronounced with respect to the data.22The second
21To compare the model with the data in terms of aggregate results, in Appendix C we report a table with
the aggregate change in employment shares by gender, sector and education level and another table with
changes in the employment shares by deciles for women, men and the overall population.
22By running OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the change in the employment share of
percentile i in the data, and the independent variable is the corresponding change in the employment share
of percentile i in the model, we find that the estimated coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting a
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Figure 6: Job polarization in the data (left) and in the model (right). First row: sectors;
second row: sectors and gender.
row of Figure 5 compares the performance of the model conditional on marital status. Sim-
ilarly to the data, singles display a flatter behavior across the skill distribution with respect
to married, and increase their employment shares along the whole skill distribution. This
is due to the fact that couples can reallocate working hours within the family, while single
individuals cannot. As in the data, married women are also largely responsible for the in-
crease at the top of the distribution, while single women contribute to a large extent to the
increase at the bottom. The intuition for this pattern can be found in the different fraction
of married and single women that acquire education between the two equilibria. In the first
equilibrium, the share of educated individuals single and married women is equal at 0.13. In
contrast, in the second equilibrium, the share of educated individuals among married women
increases by a factor of 2.53, while that of single women only by a factor of 1.80. Hence, the
former are more likely to satisfy the increase of educated labor demand while the latter are
more likely to absorb the demand of uneducated labor.
We also report polarization across sectors in the four panels of Figure 6. The outcome
good predicting power of the model. The coefficient of the regression is 0.56 when considering the overall
population, 0.56 when considering only women, and 0.28 when considering only men.
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of the model is again similar to the data. The first row of Figure 6 shows how the model
reproduces job-polarization in services and the flat behavior of manufacturing (except at
the top of the distribution) observed in the data. The second row of Figure 6 suggests that
the model does well even when decomposing sectoral polarization by gender. In particular,
it replicates the upward twists for women in services at the top and at the bottom of the
distribution and the relative homogeneity and “flatness” of the negative change in men hours
in manufacturing along the whole skill distribution. The latter behavior of men, when coupled
with the strong female polarization, is key in explaining the downward twist in the middle
of the distribution of the overall economy. In fact, this result suggests that the decline at
the bottom of the overall distribution is the result of services occupation increasing at the
middle less than in the rest of the distribution, and manufacturing occupations declining
similarly along the whole distribution.
We conclude this section by running counterfactual exercises that help assessing the role
of exogenous factors in shaping the results. In Figure 7 we set skill-biased technological
change to zero. As the left-panel shows, removing this type of technological change makes
employment polarization disappear. Changes in employment shares are roughly flat from
percentile forty to the top of the skill distribution. For men, the effect is to make changes
along the distribution entirely homogeneous (and roughly zero). For women, both the in-
crease at the top and at the bottom of the distribution are smaller. Note that this can
be interpreted as the existence of consumption spillovers from wealthy high-skilled women
who increase the amount of time worked in the market and, as a consequence, demand ser-
vices that are substitutable to home production, thus fostering the demand for low-skilled
women.23
Figure 8 displays the counterfactual in which gender-biased technological change is set to
zero. The main effect is to shift up the graph for men and down the graph for women. The
effect on overall polarization is negligible. This suggests that the gender wage gap channel
increases market hours of women in a homogeneous way along the distribution and does not
have a first order effect of the shape of employment polarization. It is, instead, quantitatively
relevant for determining the position of the curves of the two gender.
7 Predicting the Pre-Polarization Era
The results in the calibrated model presented in Section 6 are driven by the exogenous
factors evolving between 1980 and 2008. A natural out of sample test of the model is to
23We will return on the existence of consumption spillovers due to skill-biased technological change in
section 8, when we analyze each one of the three decades in the 1980-2008 period.
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Figure 7: Counterfactual: No skill-biased technological change
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Figure 8: Counterfactual: No gender-biased technological change
study the behavior of employment shares when the trends in exogenous factors are those of
the 1960-1980 period. If the calibrated model performs well outside the calibration period,
then we can argue that the exogenous factors in our model are the key drivers of changes in
employment shares since 1960.
As skill-biased and gender-biased technological change cannot be directly measured from
the data, we rely on the results in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010). Thus we
set an average growth rate for skill-biased technological change of -0.0066 and an average
growth rate for gender-biased technological change of 0.0064 during the 1960-1980 period in
our experiment.24 For home labor productivity we follow Bridgman (2016), who measures an
average growth rate of 2.5% for the pre-1980 period. We assume that labor productivity in
the three market sectors displays the same growth rate as in the 1980-2008 period.25 Finally,
24We thank Kjetil Storesletten for providing the numbers. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010)
compute the implied skill-biased and gender-biased technological change for the period 1966-2005. We use
their numbers for the 1966-1980 period to compute an average growth rate that we apply to the 1960-1980
period. To be consistent with our benchmark calibration we also need to scale the numbers in Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2010) by an appropriate factor. For convenience, we describe how to compute
this factor in the next section. Note that measures of technological change in Heathcote, Storesletten, and
Violante (2010) are appropriate in our setting because we employ the same production function. Although
they have a unique production function at the aggregate level, while we have various sectors, skill-biased and
gender-biased technological change are common across sectors in our model.
25Note that in section 4 the growth rates of labor productivity are calibrated together with the rest of
parameters. This is because, due to the presence of gender-biased and skill-biased technological change we
cannot measure labor productivity with a growth accounting exercise. For this reason we assume that labor
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Figure 9: Job polarization in the data (left) and in the model (right) during the period
1960-1980.
we also match the demographic trends from 1960 to 1980.26
Figure 9 presents the comparison between employment polarization in the data and the
corresponding pattern generated by the model for the period 1960-1980.27 As the black
line in the left panel shows, overall polarization is not present, and changes in employment
shares are negative below the seventieth percentile and positive above. This trend is driven
by men, who display a monotone behavior that is similar to the overall pattern. Women
instead, display changes in employment shares which are similar along the whole distribution.
To understand the role of exogenous factors in shaping the difference between the 1960-
1980 and the 1980-2008 period, we now use the model to predict the change of employment
shares that would have occurred between 1960 and 1980 if exogenous trends had been those
of the 1980-2008 period. Results are reported in Figure 10. The dashed line in the left panel
shows that the model produces employment-polarization, although this is less pronounced
than in the benchmark case of section 6. The change in overall polarization is due to women,
who display a reduction of employment shares both at the top and at the bottom of the
skill-distribution, while employment shares of men display a change similar to the benchmark
case.
The counterfactual exercises in section 6 suggest that a key role in shaping employment
polarization in the 1980-2008 period is skill-biased technological change. To study whether
this factor per-se can explain the absence of employment polarization before 1980, we run a
counterfactual for the 1960-1980 period where all trends but skill-biased technological change
productivity growth is constant over time when projecting the model to 1960.
26See the discussion for the benchmark case in the calibration section.
27Computing employment polarization for the 1960-1980 period requires dealing with occupations that are
not present in both years. In Appendix B we discuss different methodologies to address this issue. The main
results in this section are maintained regardless of the methodology.
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Figure 10: Job-polarization in the model during the period 1960-1980 when using the
1980-2008 exogenous trends.
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Figure 11: Job-polarization in the model during the period 1960-1980 when using the
1980-2008 exogenous trends. Counterfactual with 1960-1980 SBTC.
are those of the 1980-2008 period. Put it differently, we assume that all technological change
in the model evolves at a constant rate (the average one implied by our calibration for the
1980-2008 period), except skill-biased technological change, which accelerates between the
pre- and post-1980 periods.28 Figure 11 shows that this unique difference makes changes
in employment shares flatter for women, men and, consequently, for the overall economy.
Not surprisingly, the effect of the counterfactual is similar to that in Figure 7, in which
skill-biased technological change is set to zero. The exercise thus suggests that the different
growth rate of skill-biased technological change between the pre- and the post-1980 period is
a first order determinant of the occurrence of employment polarization in the latest period.
The remaining difference between Figure 9 and Figure 11 is given by the combined effect of
gender-biased technological change and home productivity.
8 Predicting decades in the 1980-2008 period
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) show that the shape of overall polarization between 1980 and
2008 results from the aggregation of a different behavior of changes in employment shares
in the three decades. This is Fact 6 in section 3 and we report it for convenience in the left
28Strictly speaking, it switches from negative to positive growth.
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Table 5: Decade-specific exogenous trends : SBTC and GBTC
SBTC GBTC
1980-1990 0.015 0.010
1990-2000 0.014 -0.001
2000-2008 0.008 0.007
panel of Figure 12 . While some convexity in the shape is present for the three lines, there
is a clockwise tilting behavior across decades. During the 1980s the change in employment
shares is increasing along the skill distribution. During the 1990s the graph displays a U-
shape, while during the 2000s the large change in employment shares occurs at the bottom
of the distribution.
In this section we test the performance of the model in reproducing the observed changes
across decades. To do this, we feed the model with decade specific measures of skill-biased
and gender-biased technological change. As in the previous section, to compute these mea-
sures we use the yearly time-series of skill-biased and gender-biased technological change
between 1980 and 2008 derived in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010). First, we
use these numbers to compute the average growth for each decade (1980-90, 1990-2000, 2000-
2008). Next, to be consistent with the total growth over the 1980-2008 period implied by
our benchmark calibration (γφ and γϕ in table 2) for each type of technological change, we
multiply each decade specific average by a scaling factor. This is given by the ratio between
total growth over the 1980-2008 period of each type of technological change in our calibra-
tion and that in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010).29 The values we obtain are
summarized in table 5. Finally, to perform our quantitative exercise we adjust the average
cost of education by decade to match the fraction of educated females and males in each
decade.30
The right panel of Figure 12 reports the behavior of the model.31 As in the data, the
model can reproduce a tilt in the three lines, with (almost) no increase at the bottom in
29In this way, we tie our hands by preserving the relative growth across decades as measured by Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2010) while at the same time we retain the total growth over the whole period
implied by our benchmark calibration. Note that for consistency we applied the same scaling factor also
in section 7 for the pre-1980 period, but the effect of the scaling factor on the results for that period is
negligible.
30To compute skill-biased and gender-biased technological change, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2010) also allow the mean cost of education to vary over time. Thus, strictly speaking, their technology
measures should be used only together with a time-varying cost of education, as we do here. In section 7 we
do not change the cost of education in 1960 because the model performs well in replicating the fraction of
educated: the shares of educated males and females in the model in 1960 are 0.0984 and 0.0600 compared
with 0.1016 and 0.0597 in the data.
31We also report the comparison between model and data of the two gender across decades in Appendix
D.
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Figure 12: Job-Polarization by decade, 1980-2008. Data (Left) and Model (Right).
the 1980s, an increase at the bottom and at the top in the 1990s and a large increase at
the bottom in the 2000s. However, the model produces an increase at the very top of the
distribution in the 2000s, something that is absent in the data.
The rationale behind the good performance of the model is the changing effect over time of
skill-biased technological change on employment shares, especially of women. To understand
this time-varying impact, note first that skill-biased technological change has one direct effect
and two indirect effects on employment shares. The former is the typical effect of skill-biased
technological change which implies an increase in the wage of educated individuals, in the
number of educated individuals and in the amount of hours of the high-skilled in production.
The latter effects are (i) a consumption spillover from the skilled (who work less at home) to
the unskilled individuals due to a rise in the demand for substitutable market services and
(ii) an increase in the labor demand of uneducated individuals together with that of educated
individuals (q-complementarity in production between educated and uneducated workers).
In the model, the direct effect dominates in the first and second decade, while the indirect
effects dominate in the last decade. The behavior of the model for the 2000s is consistent
with the evidence discussed in Jorgenson, Ho, Stiroh, et al. (2005), p. 13, who find that the
contribution to output growth of college-labor in the U.S. is substantially more important
than that of non-college educated labor during the period 1977-2000, but that the sustained
growth of the U.S. economy of the late 1990s allowed a large number of workers with low
skills to obtain a job.
To study the direct and the indirect effects of skill-biased technological change we report,
in Figure 13, counterfactual exercises for the three decades in which we set it to zero. Loosely
speaking, removing skill-biased technological change should affect more the higher part of
the distribution when the direct effects are quantitatively more important, and the lower part
of the distribution if the indirect effects dominate. From the first row of Figure 13 it is clear
that the tilting behavior across decades completely disappears at the aggregate level, once we
32
remove skill-biased technological change. Also, the counterfactual confirms that skill-biased
technological change has a time varying effect on changes in employment shares across the
distribution. In the 1980-1990 period, by removing skill-biased technological change the
increase of men shares at the top of the distribution completely disappears, while the effect
on women at the top is similar but less substantial. Thus, in the first decade, the direct
effect appears as the one quantitatively relevant. In the 1990s skill-biased technological
change becomes the main driver of employment polarization also for women. Average hours
in the market for women do not increase during this period, but women move extensively
along the skill distribution. The middle panel of the second row of Figure 13 shows that
removing skill-biased technological change reduces substantially the increase of employment
shares at the top of the skill-distribution both for women and for men. Finally, the absence of
skill-biased technological change during the 2000s removes the large increase at the bottom of
the distribution observed in the data and generated in the model by women. This suggests
that in this decade the indirect effects are the ones with quantitative relevance. These
results rationalize the emergence of consumption spillovers during the late polarization era
documented in Hazan and Zoabi (2015) for the U.S.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we study the role of gender in generating the phenomenon labeled employment
polarization. We document that the emergence of employment polarization since the 1980 is
largely a female phenomenon due to women increasing market hours of work asymmetrically
along the skill distribution. This observation motivates the study of the optimal response
of different demographic groups when skill-biased technological change occurs and home
production is an option for the agents. To do this, we construct a multi-sector general
equilibrium model with an education and occupational choice. The model shows that by
taking into account the endogenous response of heterogeneous individuals to technological
changes, it is possible to account for overall, gender and marital status specific, and sectoral
job-polarization facts. In addition, the model helps to rationalize the absence of employment
polarization before 1980 and the changing behavior of employment shares in the various
decades during the polarization era.
The model suggests that there are two main drivers for the gender differences in job-
polarization patterns. First, a general increase in working opportunities for women, homoge-
neous along the skill distribution (due to the rise of the service economy and to gender-biased
technological change). This driver accounts for the opposite sign of employment changes
between the two gender along the whole skill distribution: negative for men, positive for
33
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Figure 13: Job-Polarization by decade, 1980-2008. Counterfactual of skill-biased
technological change.
women. Second, an increase in working opportunities for educated workers (due to skilled-
biased technological change). This driver has a key role in generating the U-shape in the
change of overall and female employment shares along the skill distribution. By fostering
an increase in the working time of skilled women (mainly married) it accounts for most of
the upward twist at the top of the skill distribution. Also, by favoring a reduction in home
production, it leads to an increase in the labor demand for substitutable market services,
thereby accounting for most of the downward twist at the bottom of the skill distribution.
Our results suggest that any policy aimed at affecting the overall pattern of employment po-
larization should consider the effect on the various demographic groups that are contributing
to shape this phenomenon.
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Figure 14: Data: Ranking Method. The dashed line is from Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
The other line in each panel is our methodology as described in section 4.
Appendix
A Computing Job-Polarization
As outlined in the text we follow the methodology of Acemoglu and Autor (2011) in creating
polarization graphs. For the benchmark graphs we use the 1980 Census of Populations (5%
sample of the US) and the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS) (1% sample of the
U.S). In sections 6 and 7 we also use the 1960 (1% sample of the US), 1990 and 2000 (5%
sample of the US) Census of Populations. For detail on the data selection process and
treatment see the Appendix A in Autor and Dorn (2013). The only difference here is the
ranking methodology of occupations in 1980, since we not only compute average wages by
occupation, but instead compute average wages by a combined measure of the three sectors
and occupation Census classifications.32 In Figure 14 we report the polarization graphs
generated with the methodology in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and ours. The resulting
difference between the two ranking methods generates minor deviations.
B Treatment of the Data for the 1960-1980 period
To compute employment polarization in the 1960-1980 period we retain the same sample and
data correction procedure as Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013) from
the polarization era for the 1960-1980 period. That is, we use all occupations that exist both
in 1960 and 1980. However, as there are fewer Census occupations represented in 1960, to
avoid losing a large share of the working population in 1980, we compute changes by decade
(1960-1970 and 1970-1980) and then add the decades for the overall employment effect.
More specifically, using the 1980 occupational ranking and applying the same procedure as
32See Section 4.
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Figure 15: Different methodologies for the 1960-1980 period. The continuous line reports
employment polarization as computed in Figure 9. The dashed line is constructed following
the methodology in Barany and Siegel (2015).
in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) would require dropping 21.5 percent of the work force in 1980
and 6.6 percent in 1960. Instead, using a decade by decade approach drops 1 percent of the
workforce in 1960, 13 percent in 1970 and 9.3 percent in 1980. Given that this methodology
still does result in dropping a share of the workforce we also use the methodology in Barany
and Siegel (2015).33 This consists in creating a consistent occupational grouping from 1960
to 1980 to avoid dropping any of the work force. Note that with this alternative occupational
classification each occupation is more heterogeneous than the original measure.34 Also the
new specification results in women showing no U-shape (employment-polarization) in the
1960-1980 period. In contrast, men’s changes in employment shares during the 1960-1980
period are sensitive to the methodology used. However, in general the 1960-1980 period
consistently shows no polarization for the aggregate population.
C Additional Tables
Table 6 summarizes the employment changes in the data and the benchmark model by
skill decile. Each cell reports the average employment change (in percent) within a decile
between 1980 and 2008. Table 7 compares the change in hours worked by gender, education
and sectors in the data and the benchmark model.
D Gender Behavior by Decade 1980-2008
Here we report the behavior of employment shares of women and men for the three decades
1980-2008 in the data and in the model. The comparison is reported in Figure 16. The tilting
33We thank Zsofia Barany and Christian Siegel for sharing the occupational classification codes.
34Note also that Barany and Siegel (2015) drop occupations in agriculture while here we use them.
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Table 6: Aggregate Results : Deciles
Decile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Data
All 8.8 0.3 -5.1 -7.2 -7.7 -4.2 0.6 5.6 12 20.1
Women 9.6 -0.2 -3.5 -2.6 0.7 6.3 11.6 15.1 17.8 20.0
Men -0.7 0.4 -1.6 -4.6 -8.4 -10.6 -11.0 -9.5 -5.8 0.2
Model
All 19.8 5.7 -4 -9.7 -12.3 -11.5 -6.3 2.6 15.3 34.5
Women 19.4 9.7 2.5 -2.2 -4.3 -3.5 0.2 5.2 10.9 16.9
Men 0.5 -4 -6.5 -7.5 -8 -8.1 -6.5 -2.6 4.3 17.5
Table 7: Percentage Change in hours worked across categories 1980-2008
Category % Change
Women Data Model
Uned - ss services 0.02 0.04
Uned - manufacturing -0.03 -0.05
Uned - ms services 0.11 0.07
Ed - ss services 0.02 0.03
Ed - manufacturing 0.01 -0.04
Ed - ms services 0.11 0.06
Men Data Model
Uned - ss services 0.02 0.01
Uned - manufacturing -0.07 -0.14
Uned - ms services 0.02 0.02
Ed - ss services 0.01 0.02
Ed - manufacturing -0.05 -0.11
Ed - ms services 0.04 0.05
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Figure 16: Job-Polarization by decade and gender,1980-2008. Data (Left) and Model
(Right). First row: females; second row: males.
behavior across decades is apparent both for women and for men, although to a different
extent. The model reproduces the tilting behavior across decades for the two gender.
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